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ABSTRACT
People share a wide variety of information on Twitter, including
the events in their lives, without understanding the size of their
audience. While some of these events can be considered harmless
such as getting a new pet, some of them can be sensitive such as
gender-transition experiences. Every interaction increases the vis-
ibility of the tweets and even if the original tweet is protected or
deleted, public replies to it will stay in the platform. These replies
might signal the events in the original tweet which cannot be man-
aged by the event subject. In this paper, we aim to understand the
scope of life event disclosures for those with both public and pro-
tected (private) accounts. We collected 635k tweets with the phrase
“happy for you” over four months. We found that roughly 10% of
the tweets collected were celebrating a mentioned user’s life event,
ranging frommarriage to surgery recovery. 8% of these tweets were
directed at protected accounts. The majority of mentioned users
also interacted with these tweets by liking, retweeting, or replying.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and pri-
vacy; • Human-centered computing → Social content sharing;
Social media.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSN) are used by billions of users to con-
nect with other people such as friends, colleagues, and people with
similar interests. They share their daily lives and life events on
social media; such as birthdays, marriages, buying a new car, or
acceptance to their dream university. They also use social media as
a source of support during difficult life events [4, 31]. While some
of these communications are only visible to a user’s closed network,
they can also be shared publicly for everyone to see. Sharing life
events can lead to unintended disclosure especially since OSN users
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the
author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
WebSci ’20, July 6–10, 2020, Southampton, United Kingdom
© 2020 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-7989-2/20/07. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3394231.3397919
are known to underestimate the audience size of their posts [7].
Some disclosures result in minor discomfort such as colleagues
learning that the user is moving house, leaving their job, or getting
a divorce. However, some posts can result in serious damage. Posts
about surgeries and illnesses can result in insurance premium in-
creases [13] while a post about having gender transition can result
in discrimination.
Even when users restrict the audience of their posts, replies can
lead to privacy leaks [17]. For example, a funny cat photo with the
user’s full address visible in the background might be shared, or
a post about selling an item including the seller’s phone number
might be retweeted or sent on by well meaning followers. This is
especially problematic in platforms like Twitter where the visibility
of posts is only dependent on the tweeter’s account type (i.e. public
or protected). Hence, all posts from a public account are publicly
visible, even if the tweet mentions a protected account. The result
is that a public account can easily breach the privacy of a protected
account even if the breach is unintentional. Twitter recently added
a new feature to hide replies to a tweet but it is still possible for
others to access those replies with few clicks [30].
In this paper, we focus on finding happy life events shared on
Twitter, a social media platform where users may share posts of up
to 280 characters. We selected Twitter partially because its course
privacy controls where accounts are either public with all their
tweets world readable, or protected where only an approved set
of users can read them. Users are also able to mention each other
in tweets (e.g. “@username”), which makes it easy to link tweet
content to specific accounts. While simple, this privacy model can
lead to public accounts having conversations with protected ac-
counts where half the conversation is world readable. For example,
a protected account might say “its my birthday!” and the public
account might respond “happy birthday @alice!” disclosing the
protected account’s birthday publicly. Using Twitter also makes it
possible to identify users’ life events at scale, potentially even for
protected accounts.
In particular, we are interested in tweets where the poster says
that they are happy for an explicitly mentioned user regarding a
life event. We ask the following research questions:
RQ1 What kind of life events can be detected in tweets that
express happiness for a mentioned user?
RQ2 How do users react (e.g. like, retweet or reply) to such
tweets when they are mentioned in them?
RQ3 Howdo protected (private) accounts react (e.g. like, retweet)
relative to public accounts in these cases?
To answer these questions, we collected 1.4million tweets/retweets
between July and October 2019 containing the exact phrase “happy
for you”. We removed all posts involving verified accounts, as these
are held by famous people or organizations and tend to have a large
number of Twitter users discussing their life events, which would
likely skew the data. We also removed retweets, and tweets that
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mention no users, resulting in 635k tweets. We then used LDA [8]
to detect topics in the dataset, resulting in 12 identified life events
topics; including positive events like having a new baby, marriage,
and graduation, as well as sensitive topics such as cancer, surgery,
mental health and LGBTQ-related. However, as expected, not all
tweets in our corpus corresponded to life events. Out of the orig-
inal 635k tweets, only 59k belonged to a life event related topic.
Looking only at the life event tweets, 51k mention only a single
user, providing a clear indication of who is experiencing the life
event. Out of these 51k tweets, 4k mention a single protected user,
potentially breaching that user’s privacy by making their life event
public. The majority of protected and public account users reacted
to the life event tweet mentioning them.
Our results suggest that it is possible to automatically identify
Twitter users’ key life events, even if they have a protected account.
The outcome has implications for privacy, particularly around the
impact of the sharing decisions of connections.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Harms
Disclosing events like vacations and illnesses can have unwanted
results. Vacations may signal that the tweeter’s home is vacant and
burglars can use this information (e.g. PleaseRobMe.com). Sharing
severe illnesses may result in increased premiums by insurance
companies [13]. Mao et al. [26] looked for tweets with vacation,
illness and drinking topics by using keyword-based data filtering.
They classify these tweets as sensitive or non-sensitive using Naive
Bayes with bag-of-word model.
2.2 Networked privacy
OSN users tend to underestimate the size of the audience of their
posts. Bernstein et al. [7] found that the users’ imagined size of the
audience is 27% of the true audience size. This underestimation may
lead to oversharing and unexpected privacy leaks. This is especially
important because of the collective aspects of the OSNs. Even if a
user is privacy-conscious and they can accurately estimate the posts’
reach, their networks could still disclose information about them [5].
For example, a user can share their location on an OSN and tag
another user, effectively disclosing where they both are. However,
most OSN providers do not allow tagged users to remove/modify
the post giving them limited control over their privacy. There are
some early proof-of-concept research to solve these collaborative
privacy situations automatically [16, 21, 22], but they have yet to be
adopted by any OSN providers. Some users take drastic measures
and deactivate/delete their accounts to protect themselves from
this type of tagging [6]. However, this does not prevent creation of
shadow profiles where information about them is shared by their
networks [12].
Users’ age, gender, religion, diet, and personality can be inferred
only using the tweets mentioning their account [20]. Also analysing
a user’s connection network can disclose attributes about them such
as age, gender, location, political orientation, and sexual orienta-
tion [2, 3, 19, 25, 32].
2.3 Detecting and inferring life events
Detecting life events using social media posts is not a new research
area. Researchers have looked at a range of feature sets, types of
life events, and approaches in an effort to accurately automatically
identify these events from messy social media data.
Simple keyword queries were tried by De Choudhury et al. [9] to
find women who were new mothers. They used keywords curated
from birth announcements of local newspapers to find accounts of
potential new mothers, then used lexicon-driven gender inference
to identify women (as opposed to new fathers), with a 83% accuracy
rate. Finally, they used crowdsourcing to label the accounts as new
mothers or not, to have a high precision dataset.
Other works use keywords to gather a life event themed corpus,
crowdsourcing to annotate it, and then use the annotated data to
build a model that can automatically associate tweets with a life
event. Dickinson et al. [10], focused on five life events psychologists
have identified to be the most prominent in peoples’ lives: “Starting
School”, “Falling in Love”, “Getting Married”, “Having Children”,
and “Death of a Parent”. They were able to use the content features
of tweets such as n-grams, mentions, and number of retweets, user,
semantic, and interaction features to build an effective classifier
using labeled data from crowdsourcing. Similarly, Akbari et al. [1]
focused on personal wellness events (diet, exercise, and health).
They used keywords to collect tweets from Twitter, manually la-
beled them, and built a classifier.
Instead of starting with a specific set of life events, some research
starts with a very broad corpus and identifies the life events that
exist within it. Li et al. [23] collected tweets using the broad key-
words “congratulations” and “condolences” and used LDA [8] to
find topics in the data set from which they focused on the life event
topics. In their approach, they start with tweets identified through
keyword matches, then look for any parent tweets, combining the
parents and children into one document of only verbs and nouns.
They used bootstrapping to find phrases other than “congratula-
tions” and “condolences” used in the tweets such as “have fun” and
“my deepest condolences” to expand their dataset. They repeated
this process for four times and found 30 different phrases alongside
with 42 event types.
Our work also uses broad keywords to gather an interesting
corpus and then identify the life events found in it. However, rather
than focus on general posts, we attempt to identify life events
posted by people other than those experiencing the event. This
focus allows us to look not only at public users, but also get a sense
of the life events experienced by protected accounts.
3 DETECTING LIFE EVENTS FROM TWEETS
For our study, we collected tweets that contain the phrase “happy
for you”. Those tweets were then clustered according to the life
event discussed in them. We analyzed these tweets to understand
whether they are mentioning protected or public users. We describe
our data collection, analysis and topic clustering below.
3.1 Tweets Collection
Using the Twitter streaming API [28], we collected tweets that
contain the words “happy for you” resulting in all tweets that have
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these three words but not necessarily in consecutive order. So, we
filtered the tweets to only those that have the exact phrase.
We streamed tweets for four months between July and October
2019. A set of 1.4 million tweets/retweets were collected that con-
tain the phrase “happy for you”. Multiple filtering steps were then
applied to the collected tweets. Initially, we filtered out all retweets,
since we are only interested in the original tweet. In addition, we fil-
tered out tweets that have no explicit mentioned accounts, since we
are only interested in the tweets directed to specific users indicating
they were about them. We then checked the type of the mentioned
accounts within our tweets and removed any tweet mentioning
verified accounts which indicates that the event is probably about a
famous person, and thus privacy is less of a concern. After all these
filtering steps, we had 634,590 tweets mentioning a total of 777K
Twitter accounts. We refer to this dataset as “HFY” tweets dataset.
We divided the tweets according to the number of accounts
mentioned in them and the conversation type of the tweets. We
call the tweets that mention only one account single tweets, and
the ones who mention more than one account is called multiple
tweets. A tweet that mention another user has one of the following
conversation types; a reply to an existing tweet, directed to a user,
or other. Reply tweets are direct replies to another existing parent
tweet; directed to a user tweets are not replies but they mention
another account at the start of the tweet (e.g. “@username heard
about the new addition to the family, I’m happy for you”). Other
comprises all the tweets that mention at least one user but at the
middle or end of the tweet. We use these terms throughout the
paper. The majority of the tweets in HFY (607,703 tweets, 96%) are
replies to another parent tweet.
3.2 Finding Life Events
Since all our tweets have the phrase “happy for you” for a givenmen-
tioned user, our next task was to infer the event that the mentioned
users are being congratulated for. Manually checking each tweet is
not feasible, since our HFY dataset contains 635k tweets. Hence, we
used Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic modeling [8] to cluster
tweets into topics. By setting an input 𝑛 as a suggested number of
topics, LDA modeling assumes that each document in the corpus is
a mixture of topics and each topic is a mixture of words. It uses a
bag-of-words approach where the order of the words are ignored.
First, we cleaned the tweets, lemmatized them and used the python
implementation of gensim’s ldamallet [27] to find the topic models.
Tweet Pre-processing: Given a tweet, we firstly converted it to
lower case. We removed URLs, mentioned accounts (“@username”),
as well as the # character in hashtags. Then we tokenized the tweets
with the NLTK tweet-tokenizer [24]. After this step, we removed
the words “happy”, “for” and “you”, since they were common in all
tweets in our collection. We also removed emoji. We used bigram-
phraser provided by the gensim to combine words that co-occur
concurrently more than 100 times in the dataset. For example “safe
travel”, “speedy recovery”, and “health pregnancy” are some of the
bigrams we have in the dataset. Lastly, we lemmatized the tokens
and removed the ones that are not nouns or verbs using spaCy [15]
following the approach of Li et al. [23]. After all these steps, we
stored these lemmatized tweets for use by the LDA model.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Having a baby
Travel
Relationship Start
Cancer (in Family)
Birthday
Surgery
Graduation
Mental Health
Familial Matters
Marriage
Moving
LGBTQ
Conversation Types of Tweets (%)
reply directed to a user other
Figure 1: Topics divided by the conversation types; reply, di-
rected to a user, and other.
Creating the LDAModel:We firstly created a dictionary from
thewordswhere eachword is represented by an ID. Thenwe created
our corpus with each tweet represented by list of IDs created using
the dictionary. We used ldamallet [27] to create our LDA model. A
fixed random seed was used to be able to reproduce the model, and
we experimented clustering our dataset with different number of
topics (clusters) 𝑛. We examined the following number of topics
𝑛={10, 20, 25, 30, 40, 70, 100, 120}. After looking at the distribution
of the topic keywords and themes with each topics number 𝑛, we
decided to continue with 𝑛=100 topics, which based on manual
inspection, seems to be the optimal number of topics to produce
many clean clusters related to the life events discussed in the tweets.
Topics Selection: For each of the 100 clusters of topics, we ex-
tracted the 30 most representative words and 10most representative
tweets, where “most representative” means the highest probability
of belonging to that topic. A researcher looked through all the key-
words and representative tweets and labeled clusters as involving
life events or not, resulting in 22 clusters that involved life events.
During the process, 8 clusters were identified that contained a mix
of life events because the cluster had formed around an activity,
such as prayer, that touches on many different life events. We there-
fore chose to exclude these clusters. Three of the clusters involved
different activities associated with having a baby such as a baby
shower, so we combined these three into one “having a baby” clus-
ter. The result was 12 life event clusters, which are shown along
with examples in Table 1.
Clustering the Tweets: LDA assumes that each document is a
mixture of topics. Some of these topics are more probable in the
document and some of them less. We assumed that each tweet only
belongs to the most probable topic assigned by the LDA model.
This way, we were able to cluster the tweets to topics.
After all these steps, only 58,801 tweets from HFY were assigned
to the 12 life event topics. 86.3% of these tweets in were single, i.e.
mentioning only one account. In cases where only one account is
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Topic Keywords Example tweet
Having a
baby
family, congratulation, news, blessing, member, addition, baby, girl, mommy, daddy, preg-
nancy, delivery, healthy_pregnancy, motherhood, boy, shower, gender_reveal
@username I’m so happy for you! Can’t wait
for the baby shower!
Travel enjoy, time, rest, trip, weekend, summer, travel, visit, vacation, relax, holiday, london, japan,
flight, safe_travel, korea, europe, germany, chicago, italy
@username so happy for you enjoy your trip
[..]
Relationship
start
person, relationship, boyfriend, girlfriend, bf, partner, keeper, gf, long_distance A boyfriend like this is a keeper I’m happy
for you sis @username
Cancer (in
family)
mom, family, sister, dad, fight, brother, cancer, die, beat, lose, stage, grandma, uncle, cousin,
warrior, nephew, aunt, fighter, niece, battle, survivor, monster, treatment, grandpa
@username So happy for you! May God keep
you cancer free.
Birthday day, birthday, today, celebrate, gift, bday, present, belated_birthday @username CONGRATS AND HAPPY
BIRTHDAY IM SO HAPPY FOR YOU
Surgery hope, continue, pray, stay, recovery, health, take_care, heal, recover, speedy_recovery, rest,
improve, surgery
@username [..] hope you have ease in your
recovery.
Graduation congratulation, success, work, achievement, accomplishment, celebrate, future, earn, cheer,
graduation
[..] Happy graduation @username
Mental
health
deal, pain, struggle, problem, doctor, issue, anxiety, mental_health, fear, therapy, overcome,
depression, surgery, brain, stress, relief, med
@username I really hope you overcome your
anxiety [..]
Familial
matters
parent, kid, son, child, daughter, mother, family, mom, father, dad, bear, wife, raise, age,
miracle, birth, husband, awareness, sibling, carry, grandmother, adopt
@username [..] that you have a grandchild
too. [..]
Marriage congratulation, wedding, marry, wife, husband, marriage, invite, day, engage, dress, bride,
honor, ring, engagement, hubby, anniversary, party, honeymoon, honour, propose, divorce,
fiancé
@username [..] The wedding will be fantastic
though! [..]
Moving move, place, home, house, leave, visit, fall, room, space, settle, city, town, area, apartment,
land, pack
@username Everyone needs to leave home at
one point. I feel you sis. [..]
LGBTQ-
related
speak, people, woman, part, trust, realize, process, lie, power, figure, faith, community,
truth, accept, idea, pride, gay, doubt, gender, embrace, tran
Congratulations to my favorite lesbians![..]
Table 1: Life event topics fromHFY-LE and keywords selected from the 30 most probable words for each topic. Example tweets
shown with usernames blinded and some content removed for privacy.
mentioned, we can safely assume that the event is about that user,
but for tweets with multiple mentioned users it is impossible to
accurately infer who is the event subject. Therefore, we focus on
single tweets in our analysis. We call this subset HFY-LE for Life
Event. 8% of HFY-LE mention protected accounts.
3.3 Resulting Clusters
Of all the tweets in HFY-LE, 47,342 (93%) were in reply, 2% were
directed to a user and remaining were other. This shows that nearly
all tweets were sent in response to an existing tweet. However, some
topics received more tweets as reply than others. 97% of tweets
with “mental health” and “surgery” topics were reply whereas this
rate was 83% for “marriage”. Tweets with sensitive topics related
to health, sexual orientation, and so on were more likely to be
replies to existing tweets. On the other hand, commonly celebrated
things like marriage, birthday, and graduation are more frequently
tweeted as a stand-alone tweet rather than in reply. The rates of
the conversation types for each topic is shown in Figure 1.
The largest topic is “having a baby” with 15,289 tweets since it is a
combination of three topics from the original clusters. The smallest
topic is “LGBTQ-related” with only 2,387 tweets. In Figure 2, we
provide the number of tweets from each topic broken by the account
type of thementioned users, we do not display “having a baby” since
it is four times the second largest cluster. “Having a baby” has 13,912
tweets mentioning public accounts and 1,377 mentioning protected
ones. The topic with the most protected tweets is “marriage” with
9%, whereas “familial matters” tweets are the least common with
6%.
0
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2500
3000
3500
4000
Life Event Topics
Single Public Tweets Single Protected Tweets
Figure 2: Number of tweets broken by the type of the men-
tioned user (“having a baby” not shown).
4 REACTIONS FROMMENTIONED USERS
After determining tweet topics, we collected the reactions from
mentioned users such as likes, retweets, and replies to understand
how users react to having their life-events disclosed by their friends.
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4.1 Collection of Reactions
Four months after the last tweet was collected, we extracted the
mentioned accounts and gathered the reactions to the tweets in
the HFY-LE. Firstly, we tried to retrieve the reactions (like, retweet,
or reply) to each tweet in HFY-LE. Some of these tweets were not
available for various reasons, for example the tweet was deleted or
the user protected their account.
4.1.1 Collection of Likes/Retweets. For the tweets we could reach,
we checked whether the mentioned user liked or retweeted the
tweet; however, the provided Twitter API retrieves this data very
slowly. Hence, we used Twitter user interface (UI), which shows
how many times a tweet is liked/retweeted. We also retrieved the
list of who liked/retweeted via the UI. If the mentioned user’s screen
name is in the list, then we conclude that the user liked/retweeted
the tweet. One drawback of this approach is that we can only get
25 people from the list. Hence, if the tweet is popular and has more
than 25 likes/retweets, then we cannot decide whether the tweet
was liked/retweeted by the mentioned user. However, this is a rare
situation that happened in only 229 tweets from the 51k tweets in
HFY-LE.
Protected accounts’ tweets and likes are hidden, so we cannot see
if they interacted with tweets. If a protected account likes/retweets a
tweet, it will not show in the UI list but will still be counted towards
the total likes/retweets. The difference between the like/retweet
count and the number of users in the list indicates the number
of protected accounts who liked/retweeted the tweet. Thus, we
used this information to estimate if a mentioned protected account
has likes/retweeted the tweet. While we cannot be sure that the
protected account likes/retweeted a tweet is the mentioned one, we
believe it is reasonable to assume so. The same drawback mentioned
earlier also applies here, if a tweet is liked/retweeted more than 25
times we cannot be sure about the hidden like/retweet counts.
4.1.2 Collection of Replies. Next we collected user replies to the
tweet by collecting the timelines of the mentioned users that were
not protected and scanning them for replies. Since Twitter API does
not have a feature that gives the replies to a tweet, we had to get
the timelines of each mentioned user to check whether there is a
reply to the tweet mentioned in them in HFY-LE. We check every
tweet of the mentioned user between the time of the original tweet
and the response collection time. The Twitter API only allows us
to get the last 3200 tweets from a user’s timeline. Hence, for some
of the users we were not able to decide whether they replied or
not since they tweeted more than 3200 after the original tweet was
sent.
We could not apply the same method for protected accounts,
since their timeline is inaccessible. Thus, reactions of protected
accounts by replying to tweets mentioned them is unfortunately
not included in our analysis. Similarly, we could not retrieve tweets
from users who were suspended or deleted their accounts or were
unreachable for other reasons.
4.2 Analysing Users’ Reaction
When collecting likes and retweets, we found that 5,910 (12%) of
the tweets could no longer be viewed. However, since we had the
ID and the mentions of the tweet, we could still check if there was
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Figure 3: Reactions (reply, like, and retweet) by the men-
tioned users in the HFY-LE tweets.
a reply from the mentioned users. We couldn’t reach the tweets
from each topic with similar rates; between 10% (“moving”) and
13% (“familial matters”). On the other hand, aside from the 4,005
protected accounts, we couldn’t reach further 3,084 (7%) mentioned
users to collect reactions. These rates are between 4% and 8% for
the most of the topics, while the rate for “surgery” is 13%. This
might mean that these users delete their profiles more than other
mentioned users in other topics.
From the ones we could reach, 24,047 (62%) of the tweets were
liked by public mentioned uses. Similarly, 2,221 (6%) of the tweets
were retweeted by the mentioned user. On the other hand, 2,319
(68%) of the tweets that mentioned a protected account had hidden
likes and 203 (6%) of them had hidden retweets. While we cannot
be sure all of these hidden likes/retweets were from the mentioned
users, it gives us some idea about the interactions. 11,941 (42%)
of the users with public accounts replied to the tweets they were
mentioned in. The average time to reply was 5 hours while the
longest was just over three months. In total 27,545 of the mentioned
users showed at least one type of reaction. 941 of them reacted using
all three ways to the tweets (i.e. like, retweet, and reply). 7,256 did
not give any reaction.
Figure 3 shows the reactions from the mentioned user for each
topic. All of the topics had similar rates of likes from the mentioned
user. “Familial Matters”, “marriage”, and “LGBTQ-related” topics
were on the lower end while “having a baby”, “ birthday”, and
“travel” were on the higher end. For retweets, “travel” and ”mental
health” were on the lower end while “marriage” and “having a baby”
on the higher end.
In every topic, the rate of likes from the protected users are more
than the like rates of the public users. As mentioned, this may be a
result of counting every tweet that mentions a protected account
with hidden likes as a reaction. Still they show similar patterns with
the public tweets.
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5 DISCUSSION
The purpose of our study is to understand how users’ privacy can
be breached from social media posts by people happy about their
life-event. To measure this, we used the general phrase “happy
for you” to collect potential tweets that might communicate with
other users about happy events in their life. We managed to collect
a large number of tweets mentioning users, including protected
accounts. Using LDA, we inferred the discussed life-event in around
10% of the collected tweets. We managed to identify 12 life-events
that we included in our analysis. This result relates to our first
research question, where life-events about new born baby, mar-
riage, graduation, and mental health could be inferred from the
tweets. Investigating our second and third research questions, it
was interesting to find the most users react positively to tweets
that disclose their life-events. More surprisingly, we noticed that
tweets were liked more often by the protected accounts, who could
be assumed to have more privacy concerns but may consider their
protected status sufficient protection.
5.1 Implications of Findings
The stated purpose of online social media is to help people connect
with one another through a shared medium. It is therefore unsur-
prising that users would use such platforms to share life events
since sharing is a commonway people build social groups. However,
the highly public nature of Twitter also means that information
shared is open to a world-wide audience, a fact that may be tech-
nically known by users, but hard for them to conceptualize since
many people believe that they themselves are not sufficiently inter-
esting for an attacker to bother with [29]. But this view does not
necessarily match how groups use data at scale.
The life events we identified are similar to those Janssen and
Rubin [18] found when asking adults from Netherlands about the
seven most important events that will happen in an ordinary Dutch
child’s life. “Having children” is the most frequently mentioned life
event by Dutch people which is similar to our results where the
largest topic cluster was “having a baby”. Our other topic clusters
also line up well with their results, indicating that our identified
“happy for you” life event clusters do align with common important
life events, suggesting that such data can be automatically extracted
from Twitter.
Life events are big money for companies. Target famously hired
analysts to predict which of their customers were pregnant so
they could market to them before the birth announcement because
new parents tend to purchase large quantities of items [11]. In
our clusters we identified multiple tweets from marketers who
were targeting people experiencing life events. For example, several
wedding planning groups were replying to user tweets where they
talk about their engagement or upcoming wedding. For example,
a Twitter user posted about getting their venues booked for an
upcoming wedding, resulting in the reply: “@username We’re SO
happy for you, Kayla! Can we help with planning? [url] Plan with this
Free Sample Kit: [url]”. The threat of life events being automatically
identified off of Twitter and used to target users is very real and
currently used threat vector.
Life events are not just a privacy or marketing problem. They
are also useful for attackers who want to cause harm or steal finan-
cial assets. Targeted attacks on valuable people, sometimes called
whaling, often start with the attacker spending time on company
people pages and friending them on social media. The attacker can
then use the online trove of personal information as part of social
engineering to trick a user or system into providing more valuable
access. For example, what some companies consider to be public
non-sensitive data is used by other companies for authentication,
which means that an attacker can start with seemingly low sen-
sitive data and work there way all the way to remote resetting a
Wired journalist’s Mac [14].
Personal privacy management is also challenging on Twitter
due to the ease of creating shadow profiles where information
about a user is available via other peoples’ tweets. For example,
one friend may tweet “happy birthday @ProtectedUser” creating a
public shadow record of the protected user’s birthday, then another
public account tweets “looking forward to our trip” again creating
public data. Together these public tweets create a shadow profile
of the protected user which they cannot easily control. The design
of Twitter also facilitates the creating of shadow profiles through
the use of course access control at profile level and the culture of
replying and retweeting posts to followers. While only 8% of the
life event tweets were mentioning a protected account, that still
amounts to 4k users having their life events exposed. Our research
also indicates that the types of life events exposed for protected
and public accounts are very similar, suggesting that public posters
are equally willing to post about a range of life events for both
protected and public accounts.
While sharing and long term existence of information is a prob-
lem, we also noticed the opposite where tweets vanished and users
changed privacy settings between the time when we collected them
and when we went back to get reactions. 12% of tweets containing a
life event vanished between the collections, with each topic having
roughly the same percentage of tweets vanish. More interesting,
6.6% of mentioned accounts were deleted or suspended in that time
frame, with 12.8% of accounts mentioned in surgery life events
vanishing. This observation suggests that people are taking some
actions that protect theirs and others’ privacy.
5.2 Limitations
By using Twitter we were able to get a large sample of social media
posts to work from, but our data set and analysis still have some
important limitations to consider. Our analysis is limited to tweets
containing the phrase “happy for you”. While this is useful to collect
positive life events, it likely has few examples of common negative
life events. It also focuses our analysis on a life event that someone
else might want to provide positive commentary on.
To cluster the tweets we applied LDA which uses word co-
occurrence at the document level to discover topics. However,
tweets are very short documents which may inhibit LDA from
performing as well as it does with longer documents. LDA also
requires us to state the number of topics in advance, which is ob-
viously not a known number. We used the standard approach of
selecting several possible topic numbers, running LDA with each
setting, andmanually checking the coherence of the resulting topics.
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We also assume that each tweet has only one topic and therefore
assign each only to the most probable topic. While we did read
through many tweets during this process, we did not attempt to
manually label tweets.
We gathered the reactions from the mentioned users four months
after the last tweet was collected. The time delay meant that we
could accurately collect reactions, but it alsomeant that some tweets
and accounts vanished. Also in some cases where the mentioned
users were very active we were not able to retrieve their older
tweets because the Twitter API limits per-user tweet retrieval to
3,200 tweets.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we collected 635k tweets containing the phrase “happy
for you” that mention at least one user.We used LDA topic modeling
to cluster the tweets, resulting in 12 life event topic clusters with
51k of single tweets belonging to one of these topics. “Having a
baby” was the largest cluster while “LGBT-related” was the smallest.
8% of the tweets mention protected users and the rate of protected
user mentions in topics ranged between 6% and 9%.
The majority of tweets received reactions from mentioned users.
The most common reaction was liking the tweet, followed by re-
plying. Retweeting was the least common reaction. The rates for
likes/retweets/replies were fairly consistent between topics. Pro-
tected accounts tended to like the tweets that mention them more
often than public accounts with no major variation between topics.
To our knowledge, this is the first work that has focused on using
only the tweets that mention users to infer life events about them.
This work is important since the mentioned user cannot modify the
visibility of the tweet. A user can protect their own tweets but the
tweets that mention them can only be controlled by the tweeter. In
addition, tweets from public accounts replying to protected account
tweets can be seen by anyone and even if the parent tweet is deleted,
replies will stay visible.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported in part by the EPSRC DTA award, funded
by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council and
the University of Edinburgh. We thank everyone associated with
the TULiPS Lab and SMASH Group at the University of Edinburgh
for helpful discussions and feedback.
REFERENCES
[1] Mohammad Akbari, Xia Hu, Nie Liqiang, and Tat-Seng Chua. 2016. From tweets
to wellness: Wellness event detection from twitter streams. In Thirtieth AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
[2] Faiyaz Al Zamal, Wendy Liu, and Derek Ruths. 2012. Homophily and latent
attribute inference: Inferring latent attributes of twitter users from neighbors. In
Sixth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media.
[3] Abeer AlDayel and Walid Magdy. 2019. Your Stance is Exposed! Analysing Pos-
sible Factors for Stance Detection on Social Media. In The 22nd ACM Conference
on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing. ACM.
[4] Nazanin Andalibi and Andrea Forte. 2018. Announcing pregnancy loss on Face-
book: A decision-making framework for stigmatized disclosures on identified
social network sites. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors
in Computing Systems. 1–14.
[5] James P Bagrow, Xipei Liu, and Lewis Mitchell. 2019. Information flow reveals
prediction limits in online social activity. Nature human behaviour 3, 2 (2019),
122–128.
[6] Eric PS Baumer, Phil Adams, Vera D Khovanskaya, Tony C Liao, Madeline E
Smith, Victoria Schwanda Sosik, and Kaiton Williams. 2013. Limiting, leaving,
and (re) lapsing: an exploration of facebook non-use practices and experiences.
In Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human factors in computing systems.
ACM, 3257–3266.
[7] Michael S Bernstein, Eytan Bakshy, Moira Burke, and Brian Karrer. 2013. Quan-
tifying the invisible audience in social networks. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI
conference on human factors in computing systems. ACM, 21–30.
[8] DavidMBlei, Andrew YNg, andMichael I Jordan. 2003. Latent dirichlet allocation.
Journal of machine Learning research 3, Jan (2003), 993–1022.
[9] Munmun De Choudhury, Scott Counts, and Eric Horvitz. 2013. Major life changes
and behavioral markers in social media: case of childbirth. In Proceedings of the
2013 conference on Computer supported cooperative work. 1431–1442.
[10] Thomas Dickinson, Miriam Fernandez, Lisa A Thomas, Paul Mulholland, Pam
Briggs, and Harith Alani. 2015. Identifying prominent life events on twitter. In
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Knowledge Capture. 1–8.
[11] Charles Duhigg. 2012. How Companies Learn Your Secrets. Retrieved Feb 29,
2020 from https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html
[12] David Garcia, Mansi Goel, Amod Kant Agrawal, and Ponnurangam Kumaraguru.
2018. Collective aspects of privacy in the twitter social network. EPJ Data Science
7, 1 (2018), 3.
[13] Ki Mae Heussner. 2009. Woman Loses Benefits After Posting Face-
book Pics. Retrieved April 4, 2019 from https://abcnews.go.com/
Technology/AheadoftheCurve/woman-loses-insurance-benefits-facebook-
pics/story?id=9154741
[14] Mat Honan. 2012. How Apple and Amazon Security Flaws Led to My Epic
Hacking. Retrieved March 26, 2019 from https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-
amazon-mat-honan-hacking/
[15] Matthew Honnibal and Ines Montani. 2017. spaCy 2: Natural language under-
standing with Bloom embeddings, convolutional neural networks and incremen-
tal parsing. (2017). To appear.
[16] Hongxin Hu, Gail-Joon Ahn, and Jan Jorgensen. 2013. Multiparty access con-
trol for online social networks: model and mechanisms. IEEE Transactions on
Knowledge and Data Engineering 25, 7 (2013), 1614–1627.
[17] Prachi Jain, Paridhi Jain, and Ponnurangam Kumaraguru. 2013. Call me maybe:
Understanding nature and risks of sharing mobile numbers on online social
networks. In Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Online social networks.
ACM, 101–106.
[18] Steve MJ Janssen and David C Rubin. 2011. Age effects in cultural life scripts.
Applied Cognitive Psychology 25, 2 (2011), 291–298.
[19] Carter Jernigan and Behram FT Mistree. 2009. Gaydar: Facebook friendships
expose sexual orientation. First Monday 14, 10 (2009).
[20] David Jurgens, Yulia Tsvetkov, and Dan Jurafsky. 2017. Writer profiling without
the writer’s text. In International Conference on Social Informatics. Springer, 537–
558.
[21] Dilara Kekulluoglu, Nadin Kokciyan, and Pinar Yolum. 2018. Preserving privacy
as social responsibility in online social networks. ACM Transactions on Internet
Technology (TOIT) 18, 4 (2018), 42.
[22] Nadin Kökciyan, Nefise Yaglikci, and Pinar Yolum. 2017. An argumentation ap-
proach for resolving privacy disputes in online social networks. ACMTransactions
on Internet Technology (TOIT) 17, 3 (2017), 27.
[23] Jiwei Li, Alan Ritter, Claire Cardie, and Eduard Hovy. 2014. Major life event
extraction from twitter based on congratulations/condolences speech acts. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2014 conference on empirical methods in natural language processing
(EMNLP). 1997–2007.
[24] Edward Loper and Steven Bird. 2002. NLTK: The Natural Language Toolkit.
In Proceedings of the ACL-02 Workshop on Effective Tools and Methodologies for
Teaching Natural Language Processing and Computational Linguistics - Volume
1 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) (ETMTNLP ’02). Association for Computational
Linguistics, USA, 63–70. https://doi.org/10.3115/1118108.1118117
[25] Walid Magdy, Yehia Elkhatib, Gareth Tyson, Sagar Joglekar, and Nishanth Sastry.
2017. Fake it till you make it: Fishing for Catfishes. In Proceedings of the 2017
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and
Mining 2017. ACM, 497–504.
[26] Huina Mao, Xin Shuai, and Apu Kapadia. 2011. Loose tweets: an analysis of
privacy leaks on twitter. In Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on
Privacy in the electronic society. ACM, 1–12.
[27] Radim Řehůřek and Petr Sojka. 2010. Software Framework for Topic Modelling
with Large Corpora. In Proceedings of the LREC 2010 Workshop on New Challenges
for NLP Frameworks. ELRA, Valletta, Malta, 45–50. http://is.muni.cz/publication/
884893/en.
[28] Twitter. 2019. Twitter API. Retrieved March 27, 2019 from https://developer.
twitter.com/
[29] Rick Wash. 2010. Folk models of home computer security. In Proceedings of the
Sixth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security. 1–16.
[30] Suzanne Xie. 2019. More control over your conversations: now available globally.
Retrieved May 13, 2020 from https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2019/
more-control-over-your-conversations-globally.html
WebSci ’20, July 6–10, 2020, Southampton, United Kingdom Keküllüoğlu, et al.
[31] Diyi Yang, Robert E Kraut, Tenbroeck Smith, Elijah Mayfield, and Dan Jurafsky.
2019. Seekers, providers, welcomers, and storytellers: Modeling social roles in
online health communities. In Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems. 1–14.
[32] Elena Zheleva and Lise Getoor. 2009. To join or not to join: the illusion of privacy
in social networks with mixed public and private user profiles. In Proceedings of
the 18th international conference on World wide web. ACM, 531–540.
